

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BONN 03679 01 OF 03 051610Z

43

ACTION NEA-09

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-03 H-01

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P R 051600Z MAR 75

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8462

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

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AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

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AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

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AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY SANAA

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BONN 03679

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, GW, IS

SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER ALLON'S VISIT TO BONN

SUMMARY: FROM FEBRUARY 26-28, THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINIS-
CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 02 BONN 03679 01 OF 03 051610Z

TER WAS IN BONN FOR TALKS WITH FRG LEADERS. THE

EXCHANGES ON THE MID EAST WERE CONSIDERED USEFUL BUT PRODUCED NOTHING STRIKINGLY NEW. ALLON DEVOTED CONSIDERABLE TIME TO DESCRIBING ISRAEL'S ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES AND PRESSED FOR STRONG FRG SUPPORT FOR ISRAELI CONCERNS WITHIN THE EC. THE SUBJECT OF THE "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIPS" BETWEEN THE FRG AND ISRAEL WAS WELL HANDLED AND DID NOT DETRACT FROM WHAT WAS REGARDED BY BOTH SIDES AS A VERY SUCCESSFUL VISIT. END SUMMARY.

1. ALLON'S VERY ACTIVE SCHEDULE INCLUDED AN UNEXPECTED MEETING WITH CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT WHICH HAD INITIALLY BEEN RULED OUT ON ACCOUNT OF THE CHANCELLOR'S ILLNESS. IN ADDITION TO THE CHANCELLOR AND FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER, ALLON SAW PRESIDENT SCHEEL, FINANCE MINISTER APEL, AID MINISTER BAHR, AND CSU LEADER STRAUSS.

2. ACCORDING TO OUR FOREIGN OFFICE SOURCES, THE GERMANS FOUND NOTHING NEW IN WHAT ALLON HAD TO SAY ABOUT THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE POSITIONS HE TOOK WERE HARD BUT LEFT THE IMPRESSION THAT THIS RIGIDITY WAS AT LEAST IN PART TACTICAL AND DID NOT FORECLOSE THE POSSIBILITY OF GREATER FLEXIBILITY IN THE FUTURE.

3. WITH REGARD TO DISENGAGEMENT IN THE SINAI, ALLON PARTICULARLY STRESSED ISRAEL'S REQUIREMENT FOR POLITICAL CONCESSIONS BY EGYPT TO BALANCE ITS OWN TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS. THE EVACUATED TERRITORY WOULD HAVE TO BE ENTIRELY DEMILITARIZED. IF ISRAELI WITHDRAWALS WERE SIGNIFICANT, I.E., IF THEY GAVE UP THE OIL FIELDS AND THE PASSES, THE EGYPTIAN COMMITMENT TO NON-BELLIGERENCY WOULD HAVE TO BE IN WRITING AND NOT SUBJECT TO ANY TIME LIMIT.

4. ALLON WAS SKEPTICAL ABOUT GUARANTEES, SAYING THAT THEY COULD ONLY BE USEFUL AGAINST THE ATTACK OF A SUPERPOWER; IN THIS CONTEXT, AN ISRAELI DEFENSE PACT WITH THE UNITED STATES WAS POSSIBLE, BUT IT COULD NOT BE A SUBSTITUTE FOR ISRAEL'S INDEPENDENT ABILITY TO DEFEND ITSELF. ISRAEL WAS RELUCTANT TO SEE PEACE-KEEPING FORCES FROM EITHER OF THE SUPERPOWERS IN THE MIDDLE EAST SINCE THE

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PAGE 03 BONN 03679 01 OF 03 051610Z

PRESENCE OF THE ONE WOULD INEVITABLY ENTAIL THE PRESENCE OF THE OTHER, AND HAVING BOTH OF THEM ON THE SCENE WOULD PROBABLY REQUIRE BRINGING IN FORCES FROM A THIRD PARTY SO AS TO CREATE A KIND OF TROIKA ARRANGEMENT. ALLON STRESSED THAT IF THERE WERE GUARANTEES AND PEACE-KEEPING FORCES WERE COMMITTED TO THE AREA THEN THIS SHOULD BE DONE WITHOUT TIME LIMIT AND ONLY THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD HAVE THE POWER TO WITHDRAW THE

FORCES.

5. WITH REGARD TO THE GOLAN HEIGHTS, ALLON TOLD THE GERMANS THAT HE SAW ROOM FOR NEGOTIATIONS BUT NOT FOR ANY FURTHER ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. HE CHARACTERIZED ASSAD'S POSITION AS TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO ISRAEL, AIMING AT AN OVERALL SOLUTION THROUGH THE GENEVA CONFERENCE WITH TOTAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL TO THE BORDERS OF 1967 AND ISRAELI ACCEPTANCE OF A PALESTINIAN STATE AS "PRECONDITIONS". OUR FOREIGN OFFICE CONTACTS HAVE COMMENTED THAT THE ISRAELI POSITION ON GOLAN CANNOT POSSIBLY BE AS RIGID AS SET FORTH BY ALLON SINCE THERE WOULD THEN BE NOTHING TO NEGOTIATE.

6. ALLON EXPRESSED SATISFACTION OVER ISRAEL'S STATE OF

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PAGE 01 BONN 03679 02 OF 03 051616Z

43

ACTION NEA-09

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-03 H-01

INR-07 L-02 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15

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P R 051600Z MAR 75

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8463

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

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AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 BONN 03679

MILITARY PREPAREDNESS, SAYING IT WAS BETTER THAN BEFORE
THE 1973 WAR. AT THE SAME TIME, HE SHOWED CONSIDERABLE
CONCERN OVER THE BUILDUP OF SYRIA'S ARMAMENTS, PARTI-
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PAGE 02 BONN 03679 02 OF 03 051616Z

CULARLY THE MIG 23S AND OTHER SOPHISTICATED EQUIPMENT
WHICH VERY LIKELY COULD NOT BE SERVICED BY THE SYRIANS
ALONE. ALLON WONDERED WHETHER THIS DID NOT FORESHADOW
THE APPEARANCE OF "VOLUNTEERS" FROM EASTERN EUROPEAN
COUNTRIES IN THE EVENT OF ANOTHER WAR. HE COMMENTED
AT ONE POINT THAT IT WAS EASY FOR THE ARABS TO BEGIN A
WAR SINCE THEY COULD ALWAYS COUNT ON THE SECURITY
COUNCIL TO STOP IT SHOULD THE TIDE BEGIN TO TURN AGAINST
THE ARAB SIDE.

7. ALLON SAID THAT IN ISRAEL'S VIEW THE IMPORTANCE OF
THE PLO WAS STEADILY DECREASING. NEITHER EGYPT NOR SYRIA
WANTED THE PLO TO TAKE PART IN THE GENEVA CONFERENCE
FROM THE BEGINNING. MOREOVER, JORDAN WAS PLAYING ITS
HAND VERY CLEVERLY, WAITING FOR THE APPROPRIATE TIME TO
RECOVER ITS PRE-RABAT POSITION, WHICH IT HAD NEVER REALLY
GIVEN UP. ISRAEL WAS THOROUGHLY WILLING TO ACCEPT THE
EXISTENCE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, ALLON SAID, BUT WAS
INCLINED TO THE VIEW THAT THERE WAS ROOM FOR ONLY ONE
ARAB STATE TO THE EAST OF ISRAEL. ALLON CONFESSED THAT
HIS OWN DREAM WAS OF A CONFEDERATION BETWEEN ISRAEL AND
SUCH AN ARAB STATE WITH JERUSALEM AS ITS CAPITAL. IT
WAS ENTIRELY POSSIBLE TO IMAGINE, WITHIN THE ARAB STATE
ITSELF, SOME SORT OF FEDERATED ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN ITS
PALESTINIAN AND JORDANIAN ELEMENTS. WITH REGARD TO
JERUSALEM, ALLON SAID THAT IT HAD HAD A JEWISH MAJORITY
FOR 150 YEARS. PARTITION HAD BEEN A BAD MISTAKE AND THE
CITY WOULD HAVE TO REMAIN UNITED UNDER ISRAELI SOVEREIGN-
TY, WITH SOME SPECIAL STATUS ASSIGNED TO THE HOLY PLACES.

8. ALLON ROUNDLY ATTACKED THE EC RESOLUTION ON THE MID

EAST OF NOVEMBER 6, 1973 SAYING THAT IT WAS A ONE-SIDED REFLECTION OF ARAB AND SOVIET POSITIONS. THE EUROPEANS WERE A STRONG FORCE IN THE WORLD AND HAD NOTHING TO FEAR FROM A RENEWAL OF THE OIL EMBARGO, WHICH WAS IN ANY CASE EXTREMELY UNLIKELY. FAR FROM CRINGING IN THE FACE OF ARAB THREATS, THE EUROPEANS SHOULD "SHOW THEIR MUSCLES". THE EURO-ARAB DIALOGUE SHOULD BE BALANCED BY AN IMPROVED DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN STATES AND ISRAEL.

9. IN REPLYING TO ALLON, FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER EMPHASIZED THE FRG'S SUPPORT FOR THE SECURITY AND INTE-
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BONN 03679 02 OF 03 051616Z

GRITY OF ISRAEL. AT THE SAME TIME, HE URGED THAT ISRAEL SHOW FLEXIBILITY IN ITS NEGOTIATING POSTURE. TIME, HE SAID, WAS NOT WORKING ON ISRAEL'S BEHALF. ISRAEL SHOULD KEEP IN MIND THE DANGER OF WHAT GENSCHER CALLED "OIL OPPORTUNISM". ATTEMPTING TO REFUTE ALLON'S STRICTURES AGAINST THE EC, GENSCHER STRESSED THAT THE NOVEMBER 6, 1973 DECLARATION WAS ONE OF THE BASES OF FRG MIDDLE EASTERN POLICY AND DID NOT, IN THE GERMAN VIEW, DEPART FROM THE REQUIREMENTS OF A BALANCED POLICY TOWARD THE REGION. SO FAR AS A EUROPEAN SHOW OF UNITED STRENGTH WAS CONCERNED, GENSCHER COMMENTED QUITE CANDIDLY THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO SHOW MUSCLE WHEN THE MUSCLES WERE WORK-
ING IN DIFFERENT DIRECTIONS. GENSCHER SHOWED CONSIDER-
ABLE SKEPTICISM OVER THE ISRAELI REQUIREMENT FOR A WRITTEN COMMITMENT FROM EGYPT ON FUTURE NON-BELLIGERENCY, ARGUING THAT ISRAEL'S SECURITY WOULD NOT DEPEND ON WHETHER SUCH AN UNDERTAKING WERE IN WRITTEN FORM OR NOT. HE ASSURED ALLON THAT FRG POLICY TOWARD THE PLO WAS UNCHANGED: THE FRG HAD NO INTENTION OF RECOGNIZING THE PLO UNTIL THE PLO HAD RENOUNCED TERRORISM AND ACCEPTED ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST.

10. ALLON TOLD THE GERMANS THAT, IN CRITICIZING THE POSITIONS TAKEN BY THE EC NINE, HE HAD NOT MEANT TO ATTACK THE FRG'S EFFORTS TO PURSUE A MORE BALANCED POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. ON THE CONTRARY, ISRAEL WELCOMED THIS POLICY BECAUSE OF THE GREAT INTEREST AND INFLUENCE IT GAVE THE FRG IN THE ARAB WORLD. HE HOPED THAT THE FRG WOULD MAKE GOOD USE OF THAT INFLUENCE, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO EGYPT, IN ORDER TO STRESS ISRAEL'S ABSOLUTE REQUIREMENT FOR POLITICAL CONCESSIONS TO BALANCE THE TERRITORIAL ONES THAT ISRAEL WAS BEING ASKED TO MAKE.

11. ALLON SHOWED GREAT SENSITIVITY ABOUT THE UPSURGE IN ARAB EFFORTS TO BOYCOTT FOREIGN FIRMS DOING BUSINESS WITH ISRAEL. IT WAS IMPORTANT, HE SAID, TO NIP THIS DEVELOPMENT IN THE BUD. HE HOPED THAT THE FRG WOULD

MAKE THIS POINT CLEARLY TO ITS PARTNERS IN THE EC AND
ARGUE IN THAT FORUM FOR FIRM RESISTANCE TO ARAB DEMANDS.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 BONN 03679 02 OF 03 051616Z

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BONN 03679 03 OF 03 051619Z

43

ACTION NEA-09

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-03 H-01

INR-07 L-02 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15

USIA-06 SAM-01 SAB-01 IO-10 AID-05 ACDA-05 OMB-01

EB-07 COME-00 TRSE-00 /095 W
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P R 051600Z MAR 75

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8464

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY ROME

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AMEMBASSY CAIRO

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 BONN 03679

(COMMENT: THE GERMANS, JUDGING FROM WHAT OUR CONTACTS
HAVE SAID, ARE SYMPATHETIC TO ISRAELI CONCERNS OVER THE
ECONOMIC BOYCOTT BUT AT THE SAME TIME HAVE TO RECOGNIZE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BONN 03679 03 OF 03 051619Z

THAT THE DECISIONS TO BE MADE HERE ARE PRIMARILY FOR THE
PRIVATE FIRMS INVOLVED.)

12. IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH AID MINISTER BAHR, ALLON
SOUGHT AN INCREASE IN THE FRG'S CAPITAL AID TO ISRAEL,
WHICH HAS BEEN RUNNING AT THE RATE OF ABOUT DM 140
MILLION PER YEAR ON HIGHLY CONCESSIONAL TERMS AND WHICH
IS UNTIED. THE GERMANS WERE UNABLE TO PROVIDE ANY
COMMITMENT ON THIS SUBJECT, ALTHOUGH THEY EXPECT THE AID
TO CONTINUE AT ABOUT THE PRESENT RATE FOR THE NEXT TWO
OR THREE YEARS AT LEAST. NOR WERE THEY ABLE TO PROVIDE
MUCH ENCOURAGEMENT TO ALLON WHEN HE ASKED THAT THEY
INTERCEDE WITHIN THE EC FRAMEWORK ON BEHALF OF DEVELOP-
MENT ASSISTANCE FOR ISRAEL. THE GERMANS DID AGREE TO
ALLON'S REQUEST THAT THEY DISCUSS WITH THEIR EUROPEAN
PARTNERS SOME ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL THROUGH THE EUROPEAN
INVESTMENT BANK.

13. ALLON EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE AGREEMENT OF
ASSOCIATION BETWEEN THE EC AND ISRAEL WOULD BE SIGNED BY
THE BEGINNING OF MAY SO THAT IT COULD ENTER INTO FORCE
IN JULY. THE GERMANS AGREED TO WORK TO THIS END. THERE
WAS SOME INCONCLUSIVE DISCUSSION OF THE IMBALANCE IN
BILATERAL TRADE BETWEEN THE FRG AND ISRAEL (ABOUT THREE
TO ONE IN FAVOR OF THE FRG) AND OF WAYS THAT MIGHT BE
FOUND TO REMEDY THIS SITUATION.

14. ALLON DID NOT DISCUSS THE QUESTION OF A DM 600
MILLION FRG PAYMENT TO THE "JEWISH CLAIMS CONFERENCE" AT
ANY LENGTH WITH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. HE STATED THAT IT
WAS NOT PRIMARILY A CONCERN OF ISRAEL'S ALTHOUGH HIS
GOVERNMENT WAS NATURALLY INTERESTED. ACCORDING TO
REPORTS, HOWEVER, THIS WAS A MAJOR SUBJECT IN HIS MEET-
ING WITH CSU LEADER STRAUSS. (COMMENT: THE POSITION
APPEARS TO BE THAT THE FRG GOVERNMENT, HAVING DISCUSSED
THIS PAYMENT WITH NAHUM GOLDMANN, AND HAVING
AGREED, AT LEAST IN PRINCIPLE, TO GIVE IT FAVORABLE
CONSIDERATION, HAS DECIDED THAT IT SHOULD NOT BE DONE

WITHOUT THE EXPRESS AGREEMENT OF THE PARLIAMENTARY
OPPOSITION. STRAUSS, ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, WAS
NONCOMMITTAL IN HIS REPLIES TO ALLON. THE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BONN 03679 03 OF 03 051619Z

GERMAN CONCERN OVER THE EFFECTS OF THIS PAYMENT HAS TWO
ASPECTS: FIRST, THAT IT COULD BE TAKEN AMISS BY THE
ARABS AND THUS DAMAGE FRG EFFORTS TO PURSUE AN EVEN-
HANDED POLICY TOWARD THE MID EAST; SECOND, THAT IT WOULD
SET A FURTHER PRECEDENT WHICH WOULD MAKE IT ALL THE MORE
DIFFICULT TO RESIST GIANT COMPENSATION CLAIMS FROM
EASTERN EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS WHOSE CITIZENS SUFFERED AT
THE HANDS OF THE NAZIS. OUR FOREIGN OFFICE CONTACTS
CLAIM THAT THE SECOND CONSIDERATION WEIGHS FAR MORE
HEAVILY THAN THE FIRST IN THE GOVERNMENT'S THINKING, AND
OF COURSE THIS IS TRUE A FORTIORI OF THE OPPOSITION. THE
FOREIGN OFFICE'S INCLINATION WAS TO TAKE THE POSSIBILITY
OF A SEVERE ARAB REACTION RATHER LIGHTLY, ALTHOUGH THE
PROTESTS ON THE PART OF THE ARAB AMBASSADORS AND THE
LOCAL ARAB LEAGUE REPRESENTATIVE, SINCE THE POSSIBILITY
OF THE PAYMENT FIRST BECAME PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE, HAVE IN
FACT BEEN QUITE VIGOROUS

15. THE TICKLISH SUBJECT OF THE "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP"
BETWEEN THE FRG AND ISRAEL DID OF COURSE ARISE DURING
THE VISIT, BUT ALLON WAS CAREFUL IN HIS HANDLING OF IT.
WHAT HE SAID, AS THE GERMANS UNDERSTAND IT, WAS THAT THE
LEGACY OF THE PAST IMPOSES ON THE FRG AN OBLIGATION TO
SUPPORT FULLY THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL AND THE RIGHT OF
ISRAEL TO EXIST AS A STATE. THIS IN FACT IS GERMAN
POLICY. ALLON DID NOT CLAIM THAT THE SPECIAL RELATION-
SHIP GAVE ISRAEL AN INDEFINITE RIGHT TO DEMAND GERMAN
SUPPORT FOR EVERY ASPECT OF ISRAELI POLICY. WE GATHER
THAT THIS MORE RELAXED ATTITUDE HAS TO SOME EXTENT
CHARACTERIZED THE PRESS AND PUBLIC COMMENTARY IN ISRAEL
IN CONNECTION WITH THE ALLON VISIT AND, IN THIS SENSE,
IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THERE HAS BEEN SOME PROGRESS IN THE
BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP SINCE WILLY BRANDT VISITED ISRAEL
IN JUNE OF 1973.
HILLENBRAND

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